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A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE PUBLIC–
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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
DECISIONS FOLLOWING RIRINUI AND 
PROBLEM GAMBLING  
Caleb O'Fee* 
Behind every theory of administrative law lies a theory of the state. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in the application of judicial review to government contracting decisions. New Zealand courts 
have long struggled to adopt a consistent and coherent approach in this area, and two recent decisions 
of relevance do very little to improve the situation. This article argues that a decision of the Supreme 
Court in Ririnui significantly broadens the scope of justiciability of government contracting decisions 
by providing an exception to Mercury Energy. The Court of Appeal's approach in Problem Gambling 
is more cautious but has nevertheless resulted in a broadening of the range of circumstances where 
government contracting decisions will be subject to judicial review. Beyond these limited findings the 
law both in New Zealand and overseas continues to lack consistency and coherence. This article 
suggests that while this state of affairs is undoubtedly the result of the application of a public law 
cause of action to a context which sits on the public law–private law divide, the courts should stop 
relying on an inconsistent doctrine and recognise that cases are being decided on the basis of 
normative conceptions of the proper role of judicial review in this context.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Two recent New Zealand cases that considered the justiciability of government contracting 
decisions have once again placed a spotlight on the role of judicial review in matters involving both 
public and private law. The first case, Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd, signals a shift towards a 
broader approach to the justiciability of government contracting decisions and a clear shift away from 
the narrow formula espoused by Lord Templeman in Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation 
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of New Zealand Ltd.1 In the second case – Attorney-General v Problem Gambling Foundation of New 
Zealand – the Court of Appeal has demonstrated an equal willingness to consider wider public interest 
implications when deciding on the correct scope of review in a government contracting context.2 
However, beyond these limited findings, New Zealand's approach to the justiciability of government 
contracting decisions lacks consistency and coherence. This lack of consistency and coherence is not 
limited to New Zealand. The Canadian and English courts also have inconsistent jurisprudence in this 
area.3 
The courts' difficulty in this area has undoubtedly been exacerbated by the shift towards new 
public management.4 An integral part of this shift in New Zealand was the introduction of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), institutions that are required to operate as businesses which are as profitable and 
efficient as comparable businesses not under Crown ownership.5 The development of an institution 
which is created by statute but constrained by commerce was clearly in line with international trends 
towards "the era of mixed administration".6 However, this seismic shift brought with it difficult 
questions about the proper role of judicial review – an explicitly public law cause of action – in a 
context which engages both public and private law issues.  
Theories of the state inform theories of administrative law.7 Accordingly, a court's conception of 
the proper role of judicial review in this context depends, at an abstract level, on broader theories of 
the state.8 These different theories of the state have resulted in different normative conceptions of 
administrative law in New Zealand. These normative differences determine whether judges will take 
a narrow or broad approach to the availability of judicial review in a government contracting context. 
This article suggests that it is ultimately these normative differences which are responsible for the 
  
1  Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2016] NZSC 62, [2016] 1 NZLR 1056; and Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC). 
2  Attorney-General v Problem Gambling Foundation of New Zealand [2016] NZCA 609, [2017] 2 NZLR 470. 
3  See Mark Elliott "Judicial Review's Scope, Foundation and Purposes: Joining the Dots" [2012] NZ L Rev 75 
at 75. 
4  Janet McLean "New Public Management New Zealand Style" in PP Craig (ed) The Executive and Public Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 124 at 124. See also Michael Taggart "Corporatisation, Contracting 
and the Courts" (1994) PL 351 at 351; and Jason Varuhas Damages and Human Rights (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, London, 2016) at 173. 
5  Taggart, above n 4, at 351; and State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 4. 
6  Varuhas, above n 4, at 173. 
7  Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings Law and Administration (3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009) at 1. 
8  Varuhas, above n 4, at 171. See also Harlow and Rawlings, above n 7, at 1. 
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development of incoherent and inconsistent jurisprudence in this area.9 It concludes that the courts 
need to reject an incoherent doctrine and recognise that the availability of judicial review in each case 
will depend on a court's normative conception of its role in this context. 
II RIRINUI: PUBLIC INTEREST IMPLICATIONS AND THE 
SCOPE OF REVIEW 
Ririnui is a landmark case which directly challenges the narrow bases on which government 
contracts can be reviewed.10 The majority finding rejects the finding in Mercury that government 
contracting decisions are only judicially reviewable in situations involving fraud, corruption or bad 
faith. Instead, where there is a significant public interest implication inherent in the contracting 
decision, the full panoply of judicial review grounds will be available.11 This article suggests that 
Ririnui should be interpreted as an exception to Mercury. 
The case concerned the decision by Landcorp Farming Ltd to sell a farm, Whārere, over which 
Ngāti Whakahemo claimed mana whenua or demonstrated authority.12 Landcorp is an SOE set up 
under the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (SOE Act) to manage a significant amount of former 
Crown-owned farmland.13 In accordance with a protocol agreed between Landcorp and the Office of 
Treaty Settlements (OTS), Landcorp contacted OTS to ask if Whārere would be used for any Treaty 
of Waitangi settlements in the future.14 The response from OTS was that it would not.15 It was 
subsequently admitted that Ngāti Whakahemo's Treaty claim in relation to Whārere had not been 
settled, and that OTS' view was therefore erroneous.16 Whārere was eventually sold by tender in 2013 
to Micro Farms Ltd.17  
In the High Court, Ngāti Whakahemo's case was advanced on a number of grounds. These 
included a claim that both Landcorp and its shareholding Ministers failed to comply with s 9 of the 
SOE Act and a further claim that the contract of sale was formed on the basis of OTS' invalid advice 
  
9  See generally Elliott, above n 3. 
10  Ririnui, above n 1. 
11  Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas Administrative Law: Text and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2017) at 115. 
12  Ririnui, above n 1, at [2].  
13  At [5]. 
14  At [6]. 
15  At [7] and [9]. 
16  At [53]. 
17  At [11] and [16]. 
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and accordingly it "ought to be treated as fruit of a poisoned tree".18  Ngāti Whakahemo were 
unsuccessful in the High Court and Court of Appeal, so appealed to the Supreme Court, albeit on 
slightly different grounds.19 In the Supreme Court, three decisions were at issue. The first was the 
decision by Landcorp to enter into a sale and purchase agreement with the highest tenderer, Micro.20 
The second concerned Landcorp's refusal to provide the undertaking sought by Ngāti Whakahemo, or 
to otherwise take steps to protect their position. 21  The final decision was that made by the 
shareholding Ministers not to intervene on behalf of Ngāti Whakahemo as they had for Ngāti Mākino, 
another local iwi who, at the insistence of the shareholding Ministers, had been granted a first right of 
refusal to purchase Whārere.22  
The majority issued a declaration that the decision by Landcorp to sell Whārere to Micro was a 
wrongful exercise of public power because it was made under a material mistake.23 In addition, Elias 
CJ and Arnold J would have referred the matter back to the shareholding Ministers to reconsider 
whether they would request Landcorp to give Ngāti Whakahemo the option to purchase Whārere at 
market price.24 However, neither Glazebrook nor O'Regan JJ were willing to grant such an order.25 
Justice William Young held that the decision to sell Whārere to Micro was not "of a sufficiently public 
character to warrant judicial review".26 As a result of the Court's failure to set aside the contract of 
sale between Landcorp and Micro, or to otherwise refer the matter back to the shareholding Ministers, 
Ngāti Whakahemo in effect won the battle, but lost the war. 
A The Majority Decision 
The majority concluded that a court is unlikely to be able review the decision by a SOE to enter 
into a commercial contract in the absence of fraud, bad faith or some analogous situation, a proposition 
which was accepted by all parties.27 However, the majority ultimately circumvented Mercury in 
holding that the present case fell outside the general proposition because it was not an ordinary 
  
18  Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2014] NZHC 1128 at [99] and [148]. See also Ririnui v Landcorp Farming 
Ltd [2014] NZHC 3402 at [2] for a summary of the orders made by William J. 
19  Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2015] NZCA 160.  
20  Ririnui, above n 1, at [63]. 
21  At [63]. 
22  At [63]. 
23  At [143] per Elias CJ and Arnold J. 
24  At [142]. 
25  At [147] per Glazebrook J and at [192] per O'Regan J. 
26  At [229] per William Young J. 
27  At [65] per Elias CJ and Arnold J. 
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commercial transaction.28 The majority suggested that it was not correct to describe the decision to 
offer Whārere to Ngāti Mākino – and by analogy the failure to make the same offer to Ngāti Whārere 
– as simply commercial in nature because there was a "substantial public interest component" to the 
decision.29 The public interest component centred on the sale of Whārere facilitating the obligation, 
incumbent on the Crown, to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. 30 The majority 
suggested that Landcorp's Statement of Corporate Intent evidenced a special relationship between 
Landcorp and the Crown whereby Landcorp would, in a broad sense, assist the Crown in fulfilling its 
Treaty obligations.31 Of particular relevance were several passages from the 2013–2016 Statement of 
Corporate Intent. Landcorp described its business activities therein as including the selling of non-
strategic properties where the particular land is sought by iwi.32 Reference is also made to the ability 
for Landcorp to seek compensation for retaining properties which might normally be intended for 
sale, but which are retained in case they are required by the Crown for Treaty settlements. 33 
Landcorp's decision to offer Whārere to Ngāti Mākino was, therefore, made pursuant to the Crown's 
Treaty obligations. The majority suggested that while the decision largely accommodated Landcorp's 
commercial interests, it was made for broader public interest reasons.34 Given this special Treaty 
context, the failure by Landcorp to make a similar offer to Ngāti Whakahemo was not merely 
commercial in nature and was furthermore premised on a material mistake as to the status of Ngāti 
Whakahemo's Treaty claim.35 This argument found support in Landcorp's statement in a deposition 
that it would not have sold Whārere if it thought that Ngāti Whakahemo had a credible Treaty claim 
in respect of it.36 Accordingly, the subsequent decision to sell Whārere to Micro was susceptible to 
review on broader grounds other than fraud, corruption, bad faith or something analogous.37 
The majority engaged in a rather complex line of reasoning to circumvent the narrow formula 
espoused in Mercury. A similarly complex line of argument was drawn on by William Young J in an 
effort to dismiss Ngāti Whakahemo's claim. This divergence is explored further in Part IV, and a 
possible reason for it is outlined in Part V. 
  
28  At [65]. 
29  At [71]. 
30  At [69]. 
31  At [66].  
32  At [48]. 
33  At [48]. 
34  At [74]. 
35  At [98]. 
36  At [72]. 
37  At [98]. 
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B The Minority Decision 
William Young J rejected Ngāti Whakahemo's claim on two grounds. The first centred on whether 
the decision to sell Whārere was "sufficiently public in nature" so as to warrant judicial review.38 The 
second concerned the application of s 21 of the SOE Act in light of the overall scheme of the Act.39 
William Young J, also critical of the approach in Mercury, suggested that the courts should adopt a 
more restricted approach to judicial review. The primary question would be whether the particular 
decision was "sufficiently public in character" so as to give rise to judicial review,40 a functional 
approach not unlike that espoused in R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin.41  
Drawing on various factors, William Young J concluded that the decision by Landcorp to sell 
Whārere was not sufficiently public in character.42 He suggested that the purpose of s 4 of the SOE 
Act, which requires an SOE to be as profitable as comparable businesses not owned by the Crown, 
would be frustrated if the Court was to allow judicial review of the decision.43 Allowing judicial 
review in this context would similarly cut across the resumption provisions in the Act.44 In respect of 
the Treaty context, it was suggested that the relevant obligations were incumbent on the Crown, and 
the nature of the relationship between Landcorp and the Crown was such that it was not Landcorp 's 
function to inquire beyond the Treaty advice given by OTS.45 In light of these factors, William Young 
J would not have allowed Landcorp's decision to sell Whārere to be judicially reviewed because it 
was not of a sufficiently public character. 
  
38  At [213] per William Young J. 
39  At [234]. 
40  At [213].  
41  R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815 (CA) at 847. See also Jenny Cassie 
and Dean Knight "The Scope of Judicial Review: Who and What may be Reviewed?" (paper presented to 
NZLS CLE Administrative Law Intensive, Wellington, August 2007) at 66; and Laura Hardcastle "Can't See 
the Science for the Solicitors: Judicial Review of Scientific Research in Light of Niwa's Case" (2014) 12 
NZJPIL 291 at 302–303. 
42  Ririnui, above n 1, at [229]. 
43  At [217] and [231]. See also Wellington Regional Council v Post Office Bank Ltd HC Napier CP720-87, 5 
July 1988 at 14; and Auckland Electric Power Board v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 
NZLR 551 (CA) [Mercury] at 558–560 (note that following the Court of Appeal's decision and prior to the 
case going to the Privy Council Auckland Electric Power Board's name was changed to Mercury Energy). For 
a contrary view see Michael Taggart "State-Owned Enterprises and Social Responsibility: A Contradiction in 
Terms" [1993] NZ Recent Law Review 343 at 349–352. 
44  Ririnui, above n 1, at [219]. 
45  At [221]. 
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In the alternative, William Young J considered s 21 of the SOE Act to be determinative of the 
case.46 This is directly contrary to the majority finding. Section 21 states that the failure by an SOE 
to comply with pt 1 of the Act or any statement of corporate intent will not affect the validity of any 
contract entered into by that SOE.47 Professor Michael Taggart argued that the legislative history of 
s 21 shows that Parliament did not intend the section to prevent the court's review powers where there 
has been a breach of pt 1.48 The majority held that s 21 was not engaged because Ngāti Whakahemo's 
claim did not centre on Landcorp's non-compliance with the Act or its statement of corporate intent.49 
Thus, the question of whether a judicial review claim could be brought on the basis of a breach of pt 
1 was regrettably avoided. However, the majority did suggest that the purpose of s 21 is to prevent 
the contract being invalid on the basis of the SOE's non-compliance with pt 1 of the Act or its 
statement of corporate intent.50 This obiter statement – coupled with the explicit reference to Taggart's 
view – strongly suggests that judicial review will be available even in relation to a breach of pt 1 or a 
statement of corporate intent.   
William Young J did not share this view. He argued that s 21 operates to preclude judicial review 
in relation to contracts entered into by SOEs.51 To allow third parties – in this case the courts – to 
challenge contracts entered into by an SOE on grounds otherwise unavailable to other commercial 
parties would be to put SOEs at a commercial disadvantage.52 In addition, William Young J suggested 
that the majority was wrong to conclude that Ngāti Whakahemo's claim was not based on Landcorp's 
failure to comply with pt 1 of the Act or the statement of corporate intent. He suggested that the 
majority's reference to the Crown's Treaty obligations amounted to an argument that s 9 had been 
breached.53 It must be noted that s 9 appears in pt 1 of the Act.54 Similarly, the majority's reference 
to the statement of corporate intent amounted to a suggestion that this statement had not been 
followed.55 In William Young J's view, s 21 would simply preclude the use of either argument to 
challenge a contract entered into by an SOE.  
  
46  At [234]. 
47  State-Owned Enterprises Act, s 21. 
48  Taggart, above n 43, at 353. 
49  Ririnui, above n 1, at [116] per Elias CJ and Arnold J. 
50  At [117].  
51  At [231] per William Young J. 
52  At [231]. 
53  At [232]. 
54  State-Owned Enterprises Act, s 9. 
55  Ririnui, above n 1, at [232]. 
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C Reconciling Ririnui and Mercury 
Ririnui does not overrule Mercury but rather provides an exception to it. This, however, raises 
two further questions. The first is whether the majority of the Supreme Court needed to circumvent 
Mercury's narrow formula in this case. Mercury is not good law, and its strict application could result 
in a deserving claimant being left remediless. The second question is whether Ririnui improves the 
clarity or coherence of this legal doctrine any more than Mercury. This article argues that it does not. 
However, this lack of clarity and coherence is neither unique to these cases, nor to the New Zealand 
jurisdiction. 
Mercury concerned a decision by the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) to cancel 
a contract between it and Mercury Energy Ltd to supply bulk electricity.56 The case was eventually 
appealed to the Privy Council where Lord Templeman, delivering the advice, held that decisions of 
SOEs – insofar as they are made in the public interest – are amenable to judicial review both under 
the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 (now the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016) and the common 
law.57  Although the Privy Council was willing to find that decisions of SOEs are in principle 
amenable to judicial review, the circumstances in which a court would be willing to inquire into such 
decisions would be limited to situations involving fraud, corruption and bad faith.58 It was suggested 
that Lord Templeman's approach at best resulted in further uncertainty surrounding the reviewability 
of contracting decisions by SOEs, and at worst "rendered the judgment internally inconsistent and 
ultimately hollow".59  
Undoubtedly conscious of the significant negative commentary surrounding Mercury, the 
majority in Ririnui side-stepped Lord Templeman's formula by holding that it did not apply to all 
contracting decisions by SOEs.60 In this case, the decision had a substantial public interest component 
to it giving rise to judicial review on principles broader than those outlined in Mercury. This article 
suggests that this was done deliberately on the basis that Ngāti Whakahemo were an innocent third 
party who, through no fault of their own, were about to lose their tribal lands. The absence of fraud, 
corruption or bad faith on the part of the Crown or Landcorp would have left the iwi unable to rely 
upon judicial review as a cause of action to protect their interest, and left them ultimately remediless. 
  
56  Mercury, above n 1. 
57  At 388. 
58  At 391. 
59  Taggart, above n 4, at 357. See also Janet McLean "Divergent Legal Conceptions of the State: Implications 
for Global Administrative Law" (2005) 68 LCP 167 at 185; and Kent N Phillips "Case Notes: Mercury Energy 
Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Limited" (1994) 7 AULR 746 at 754. 
60  Ririnui, above n 1, at [65]. 
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The second issue is whether Ririnui adds any more clarity or coherence to this legal doctrine than 
Mercury. The majority decision in Ririnui failed to define the boundaries of the exception to Mercury, 
except to say that Mercury would not apply where there is a significant public interest implication. 
Precisely what qualifies as a "public interest implication" is not made clear. It is possible that the law 
was left unclear to open the possibilities for judicial review of government contracting in the future. 
By refusing to explicitly define the metes and bounds of this exception, the majority addressed the 
criticism levelled at the narrowness of Mercury. However, this is a double-edged sword. While such 
an approach addresses the narrowness critique, it serves to add more fuel to the fire for those 
commentators who criticised the Privy Council for failing to resolve this issue definitively when it 
first appeared more than 20 years ago.61 The Court of Appeal in Problem Gambling sought to clarify 
the issue by reconciling the approach in Ririnui with the approach adopted in Lab Tests Auckland Ltd 
v Auckland District Health Board.62  
III PROBLEM GAMBLING 
Attorney-General v Problem Gambling Foundation of New Zealand is a clear attempt by the Court 
of Appeal to interpret the broadened state of the law in the wake of Ririnui.63 The Court of Appeal 
has interpreted Ririnui as adding a further contextual factor to those outlined in Lab Tests.64 It remains 
to be seen whether this interpretation of Ririnui is correct. However, even if the Court of Appeal is 
found to have misinterpreted Ririnui, its addition of a "nature of the interest factor" to the Lab Tests 
contextual framework will nevertheless achieve the same result that the Supreme Court intended to 
achieve in Ririnui.  
A Facts and Holding 
The case concerned a request by the Ministry of Health for proposals (the RFP process) from 
private providers for the provision of problem gambling services in New Zealand.65 The Problem 
Gambling Foundation of New Zealand had provided problem gambling services since 1988 and had 
been the largest provider in New Zealand for 10 years. 66  As a result of the RFP process, the 
Foundation lost a significant number of contracts to provide problem gambling services, and 
consequently had the scope of its services drastically reduced.67 Cognisant of the significant changes 
  
61  See Taggart, above n 4, at 357; McLean, above n 59, at 185; and Phillips, above n 59, at 754. 
62  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 385, [2009] 1 NZLR 776. 
63  Problem Gambling, above n 2. 
64  Lab Tests, above n 62, at [55]–[59].  
65  Problem Gambling, above n 2, at [1]. 
66  At [3] and [17]. 
67  At [21]. 
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to the sector brought about by the RFP process, the Ministry sought additional reassurance from its 
external auditors that the process had been conducted with probity.68 
Understandably disappointed with this outcome, the Foundation filed judicial review proceedings 
in the High Court alleging that the RFP process was flawed in a number of respects. Of importance 
was the fact that the suggested flaws in the process did not amount to allegations of fraud, corruption 
or bad faith.69 In the High Court, the Foundation was successful in reviewing the RFP process because 
it was able to avail itself of a broader scope of review.70 On appeal, the Court was unanimous in 
allowing the appeal and holding that a broader scope of review was not available.71  
The Court, citing Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, held that the prima 
facie position in relation to commercial decisions will be that only narrow grounds of review will be 
available unless there are relevant contextual matters which justify a broader scope of review.72 Those 
contextual factors include the nature of the decision and decision-maker, as well as the statute 
empowering that decision.73 To these factors, the Court added the nature of the interest which is 
sought to be protected by the judicial review action.74 Where that interest is public in nature, the court 
may be entitled to adopt a broader scope of review in order to protect that interest.75 The Court agreed 
that the successful implementation of the Crown's problem gambling strategy did serve the public 
interest.76 However, the Foundation was denied the broader scope of review because – in the Court's 
view – it was merely a disappointed commercial party seeking to "take advantage of public law 
remedies in a commercial context".77  
This is to be contrasted with the conclusion in Ririnui. The Court held that Ririnui was 
distinguishable on the basis that Ngāti Whakahemo's grievance directly aligned with the broader 
public interests at play. 78 Put another way, there was a sufficient nexus between the claimant's 
  
68  At [19]. 
69  At [27]. 
70  At [26]. For a discussion of the contextual factors justifying a broader scope of review see Problem Gambling 
Foundation of New Zealand v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1701 at [75]–[78] and [86]–[110]. 
71  Problem Gambling, above n 2, at [53]. 
72  At [41]; and Lab Tests, above n 62, at [55]–[59].  
73  Problem Gambling, above n 2, at [34]. See also Lab Tests, above n 62, at [55]–[59]. 
74  Problem Gambling, above n 2, at [42]. 
75  At [42]. 
76  At [43]. 
77  At [42]. 
78  At [46]. 
 JUSTICIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING DECISIONS 143 
 
 
grievance and the public interest. The question remains whether this is a correct interpretation of 
Ririnui. 
B Reconciling Ririnui and Problem Gambling 
Factually, Problem Gambling fits somewhat awkwardly alongside Ririnui and Mercury. At one 
end of the factual spectrum is Mercury, a case in which the impugned transaction was quite clearly of 
a commercial nature. At the other end of the spectrum is Ririnui, a case involving much broader 
considerations than merely commercial. Somewhere between the two is Problem Gambling, a case 
with a commercial flavour in the form of a government tendering process, but which nonetheless 
raised broader public issues around the contracting-out of health services. The Court of Appeal has 
clearly thought about the effect of Ririnui on the development of the legal doctrine in this area. In 
what must be considered an attempt to add some clarity to this area of the law, the Court held that 
Ririnui adds a contextual factor to those outlined in Lab Tests.  
In Ririnui, the majority – on the basis of Mercury and Lab Tests – stated the general proposition 
that judicial review of contracting decisions will be available only in cases involving fraud, corruption, 
bad faith or analogous circumstances.79 However, the majority went on to say that Ririnui fell outside 
this general proposition on the basis that there was a significant public interest implication.80 The 
Court of Appeal, ostensibly on the basis of Ririnui, concluded that another contextual factor ought to 
be added to the Lab Tests framework. This factor was described as the nature of the interest that the 
claimant is seeking to protect.81 It is clear that, in adding this further contextual factor, the Court of 
Appeal was attempting to reconcile the Supreme Court's approach in Ririnui with the existing 
framework from Lab Tests.  
The success of this reconciliation could perhaps be quantified by applying the Court of Appeal's 
approach in Problem Gambling to the facts of Ririnui. Indeed, the Court did make an obiter statement 
suggesting that Ngāti Whakahemo's grievance aligned with the broader public interest in the 
resolution of Treaty claims.82 Accordingly, the nature of this interest would have likely justified the 
adoption of a broad scope of review. Irrespective of whether this is a correct interpretation, the Court 
of Appeal's attempt to reconcile Ririnui with the existing law is practical and provides more guidance 
to decision-makers than the broad "public interest" exception propounded by the majority in Ririnui. 
  
79  Ririnui, above n 1, at [65]. 
80  At [71]. 
81  Problem Gambling, above n 2, at [42]. 
82  At [46]. 
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IV THE STATE OF THE LAW 
This Part draws several threads together to analyse the state of the law in New Zealand in the 
wake of Ririnui and Problem Gambling. At this point, the following preliminary findings have been 
made. An analysis of the decision in Ririnui reveals an exception to the general rule regarding the 
justiciability of government contracting decisions. The Court of Appeal's approach to the same issue 
in Problem Gambling interprets Ririnui as adding a contextual factor to those outlined in Lab Tests. 
Beyond these limited findings, however, the state of the law in New Zealand is unclear. A broader 
analysis of both Ririnui and Problem Gambling as well as other New Zealand case law in this area 
discloses a significant divergence of judicial approaches. This is not an issue which is unique to New 
Zealand. Part V attempts to organise this divergence into two broad categories or approaches, each 
premised on a particular theory of the state. 
A Ririnui and Problem Gambling 
In Ririnui, the most significant divergence of opinion is that between the majority and William 
Young J. Both the majority and William Young J go to significant lengths to either uphold or dismiss 
Ngāti Whakahemo's claim. The majority approach circumvented the general proposition as outlined 
in Mercury by suggesting that the case before the Court was not an ordinary commercial transaction.83 
The majority arrived at this conclusion on the basis of several pieces of evidence indicating a special 
relationship between Landcorp and the Crown in the context of Treaty settlements.84 In stark contrast 
William Young J disagreed, holding that Ngāti Whakahemo had no tenable judicial review claim. 
This conclusion was arrived at on two alternative bases. The first centred on whether the decision to 
sell Whārere was "sufficiently public in nature" so as to warrant judicial review.85 This point was not 
considered by the majority. The second concerned the application of s 21 of the SOE Act in light of 
the overall scheme of the Act.86 Again, the majority were unpersuaded by this point. It is rather 
difficult to understand how the same set of facts could have resulted in such a divergence of 
approaches in this case. When one also takes into consideration the approaches adopted in the High 
Court and Court of Appeal in this case, the matter becomes even more confusing. The approaches 
diverge to such an extent that when comparing the decision of the High Court to that of the Supreme 
Court, it is difficult to conceive of those decisions as being in the same case. 
The same issue of divergence is to be found in Problem Gambling. The Court of Appeal were 
unanimous in their reasons for allowing the appeal and striking out all of the Foundation's claims.87 
  
83  Ririnui, above n 1, at [71]. 
84  At [74]. 
85  At [213] per William Young J. 
86  At [234]. 
87  See Problem Gambling, above n 2. 
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However, the divergence appears when the Court of Appeal's approach is contrasted with that adopted 
by Woodhouse J in the High Court. Woodhouse J traversed the relevant authority in Lab Tests and 
Mercury and held that whether the scope of review is limited to fraud, corruption, bad faith or 
analogous circumstances depends on the context of the case.88 It was further held that the starting 
point in such matters is context; it is not the general proposition in Mercury, subject to context.89 The 
emphasis on context was considered to be necessary for two reasons. First, if judicial review was 
unavailable in a commercial context this would be directly contrary to established principles. 90 
Second, the court's references to "contracting decisions" and "commercial context" vary, and the 
precise definition in a given case depends on an analysis of the context. 91  Justice Woodhouse 
reviewed a substantial number of contextual factors relevant to the case before him.92 On the basis of 
that contextual analysis, he arrived at the conclusion that a broad scope of review was available, and 
accordingly the decision was able to be reviewed on all of the grounds advanced by the Foundation.93  
In contrast, the Court of Appeal cited the same authorities relied upon by Woodhouse J and came 
to the opposite conclusion. The Court held that the prima facie position will be that only narrow 
grounds of review are available, unless there are contextual factors indicating the need for broader 
powers of review.94 The Court then went on to consider and reject each of the contextual grounds 
identified by Woodhouse J as providing a justification for a broader scope of review.95 The Court 
appeared to be heavily persuaded by the fact that the Foundation was a commercial party which had 
just lost a significant commercial contract and drew the conclusion that it was merely a disappointed 
party trying to have a second bite of the cherry by way of judicial review.96 Again, it is difficult to 
see how the same factual circumstances in both the High Court and Court of Appeal in this case could 
justify the courts reaching such markedly different conclusions. Such significant divergence casts 
doubt on the ability of the courts to approach these issues in a consistent and principled way. If the 
net is cast a little wider to include other significant decisions in this context, the divergence of judicial 
approaches becomes even more apparent. 
  
88  Problem Gambling, above n 70, at [61].  
89  At [63]. 
90  At [62]. 
91  At [62]. 
92  At [75]–[78] and [86]–[110]. 
93  At [110]. 
94  Problem Gambling, above n 2, at [41]. 
95  At [43]–[53]. 
96  At [42]. See also Leah Heatley "Are Contractual Rights Amenable to Public Law Remedies?" (2016) 21 JR 
253 at 260. 
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B Other New Zealand Case Law  
Further evidence of the historically divergent approach to this issue in New Zealand can be found 
by comparing a line of authority where the courts have sought to broaden their ability to review 
commercial decisions with two cases where the courts have done the opposite. 97 In Webster v 
Auckland Harbour Board the courts sought to do the former. The Court of Appeal argued that public 
authorities have public law responsibilities, and accordingly it would be inappropriate to grant them 
unfettered discretion.98 In Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps the Court of Appeal 
followed the same line of reasoning in holding that a report into Mr Phipps's work could be judicially 
reviewed.99 The Court argued that in recent decades:100  
Courts have increasingly been willing to review exercises of power which in substance are public or have 
important public consequences, however their origins and the persons or bodies exercising them might be 
characterised …  
In Telco Technology Services Limited v Ministry of Education Collins J extended the availability 
of judicial review further to include decisions made in a commercial tendering context where the 
Crown may have breached procedural expectations to the detriment of a tenderer.101 In that case, the 
absence of statutory provisions regulating the tender process created a vacuum which could be filled 
by public law principles.102 It should be noted that this view was heavily criticised by the Court of 
Appeal in Problem Gambling.103 Finally, to this line of authority can be added an obiter comment 
from Thomas J in Vector Ltd v Transpower New Zealand Ltd.104 In that case, Thomas J opined that 
the "unduly restrictive" Mercury formula could not have been intended to exclude illegality or 
  
97  See Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1987] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) in contrast to New Zealand Stock Exchange 
v Listed Companies Assoc Inc [1984] 1 NZLR 699 (CA); and Mai Chen "Accountability of SOEs and Crown-
Owned Companies: Judicial Review, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Impact of MMP" [1994] 
NZLJ 296. 
98  Webster, above n 97, at 131. See also Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1983] NZLR 646 (CA) at 646 and 
650. 
99  Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR 1 (CA) at 11. 
100  At 11. 
101  Telco Technology Services Ltd v Ministry of Education [2014] NZHC 213 at [34]. 
102  At [37]. 
103  Problem Gambling, above n 2, at [48].  
104  Vector Ltd v Transpower New Zealand Ltd [1999] 3 NZLR 646 (CA). 
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improper purpose or motive as grounds for judicial review.105 To do so would put SOEs beyond the 
law.106  
A contrary approach is to be found in New Zealand Stock Exchange v Listed Companies Assoc 
Inc. In Stock Exchange the Court of Appeal argued that it would be contrary to Parliament's intention 
to subject all decisions of corporate bodies established under statute to judicial review.107 Only 
decisions made pursuant to a particular statutory power would be subject to judicial review.108 In that 
case, the relationship between the Exchange and a listed company was held to lie in contract, and 
therefore the relevant decision was not the exercise of a particular statutory power.109 The Court of 
Appeal in Mercury adopted the same approach in holding that the Electricity Corporation's decision 
to terminate a contract was made in accordance with the common law of contract, and it was therefore 
not the exercise of a particular statutory power.110 The Court argued that in any event, the section 
relied upon by the claimants did not confer power upon the decision maker "in any true sense" and 
furthermore the section did not provide the ability to challenge such decisions through judicial 
review.111  
C A Uniquely New Zealand Problem? 
The above analysis quite clearly discloses that the approach of the New Zealand courts to this 
issue diverges significantly. As a result, the law in this area lacks consistency and coherence. This 
Part briefly considers how the courts in England and Canada have approached this issue and concludes 
that it is a problem which courts in multiple jurisdictions have struggled to come to terms with. It is 
with this universality in mind that Part V argues that the lack of a consistent and coherent approach 
throughout the common law world has the same root cause: differing conceptions of the proper role 
of the courts in this area premised on different theories of the state. 
The English approach to the justiciability of government contracting decisions provides equal 
complexity to the approach adopted in New Zealand. One commentator has suggested that the 
approach of the English courts has tended to confuse two different propositions.112 The first is the 
rejection of judicial review in situations where the claim lies purely in contract, but it is being pursued 
  
105  At [85]. 
106  At [85]. 
107  Stock Exchange, above n 97, at 707.  
108  At 707. 
109  At 707. 
110  Mercury, above n 43, at 552.  
111  At 560–561. See also Taggart, above n 43, at 346–348. 
112  SH Bailey "Judicial Review of Contracting Decisions" (2007) PL 444 at 445. 
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on public law grounds. 113  The second proposition is that, in a contractual context, even if 
"fundamental public law principles" should apply, they are precluded by the contractual context.114 
The English courts have tended to allow judicial review only in relation to decisions which contain a 
"public law element".115 However, the case law paints a rather confusing picture as to what qualifies 
as a public law element. The public law element has been held to exist in relation to the following 
decisions: the decision to terminate an individual's common law right to be a stallholder;116 the failure 
by a local authority to adhere to a specific policy relating to the retention or disposal of certain types 
of land;117 and the failure by a legal aid board to use a fair tender process in relation to a matter of 
significant public importance.118  
Given the significant range of contexts seemingly providing a public law element, it is 
unsurprising that this approach has been criticised for being illogical and adding unnecessary and 
undesirable complication.119 A better approach was adopted in R (on the Application of Molinaro) v 
The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.120 In that case, Elias J held that authorities which are 
exercising a statutory function should in principle be subject to judicial review unless the complaint 
would undermine relevant private law principles.121 However, Molinaro has had limited application. 
Accordingly, the courts in England appear to have struggled with this issue to a similar extent to their 
New Zealand counterparts.  
The Canadian courts do not appear to have fared much better. David Mullan, a leading 
commentator on administrative law in Canada, argued that "the law governing judicial review of 
procurement decisions in Canada is still in a state of turmoil or confusion". 122  While not all 
government contracting decisions are procurement decisions, many of the issues raised in a 
  
113  At 445. 
114  At 445.  
115  R (t/a Hammer Trout Farm) v Hampshire Farmers Markets Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1056 at [16]. 
116  R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 1052 (CA) at 1052. 
117  R v Bolsover DC, ex parte Pepper (2001) 3 LGLR 20 (QB) at [33]. This is not unlike the majority approach 
in Ririnui, above n 1, at [48]. 
118  R v Legal Aid Board, ex parte Donn [1996] 3 All ER 1 (CA) at 1–10. 
119  Eleanor Aspey "The Search for the True Public Law element: Judicial Review of Procurement Decisions" 
2016 PL 35 at 35; and Bailey, above n 112, at 444. 
120  R (on the Application of Molinaro) v The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2001] EWHC 896 
(Admin). 
121  At [65] and [69]. See also Sue Arrowsmith "Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers of Public 
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procurement context apply equally to other forms of government contracting. The leading authority 
in this area, Shell Canada Products v Vancouver (City), provides a number of reasons or principles 
for and against allowing judicial review.123 Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority adopted a similar 
approach to the question of whether a matter is public, thus warranting judicial review, or private and 
thus excluded from judicial review.124 While a broad contextual approach does away with some of 
the rigidity of a strictly doctrinal approach, it also has the potential to result in inconsistent outcomes. 
An example of this is to be found when comparing 2169205 Ontario Inc (cob Lefroy Freshmart) v 
Ontario (Liquor Control Board) with Dignam v New Brunswick Liquor Corp. In Lefroy a procurement 
process to select "agency stores" to run liquor outlets on behalf of the Canadian government was 
considered not to have engaged public interest issues, making judicial review unavailable. 125 
However, in Dignam, an application for judicial review almost indistinguishable from that in Lefroy 
succeeded on the basis of Shell.126 
An analysis of the approaches adopted in England and Canada points strongly to the conclusion 
that the inconsistency and incoherence in this area of the law is not limited to New Zealand. The 
English approach could be usefully summarised as one which invites the courts to search for a public 
law element justifying the invocation of judicial review.127 The Canadian approach is not entirely 
dissimilar but tends to provide more guidance in the form of broad contextual tests. This inconsistency 
across jurisdictions raises the broader question of why the courts have struggled to develop a clear 
and consistent doctrinal approach to this issue. The article suggests that this is because the courts have 
conceptions of their role premised on differing theories of the state. 
V A DICHOTOMY OF APPROACHES 
In considering whether matters involving government contracting are to be subjected to the court's 
supervisory jurisdiction by way of judicial review, the approach of the courts tends to fall into one of 
two categories: a narrow approach and a broad approach. Whether a court – or in some cases a 
particular judge – adopts a narrow or a broad approach is founded upon a conception of the proper 
role of the courts in this area, a conception which is premised on a theory of the state. The divergence 
in theories of administrative law among judges translates into a divergence in approaches to judicial 
review. This divergence is especially pronounced in the case of government contracting as the context 
is on the border between public and private law. 
  
123  Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver (City) [1994] 1 SCR 231 at 240–241.  
124  Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority and Porter Airlines Inc 2011 FCA 347 at [60]. 
125  2169205 Ontario Inc v Ontario (Liquor Control Board) [2011] ONSC 1878 at [30]. 
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A Theory of Administrative Law  
Harlow and Rawlings state that "behind every theory of administrative law lies a theory of the 
state".128 Consistent with the apparent human need to classify things in order to make sense of them, 
a number of academics have attempted to organise theories of the state – and by implication, theories 
of administrative law – into categories or classes of thinking. Harlow and Rawlings draw on a traffic 
light metaphor to achieve this.129 So-called "red light theorists" favour strong judicial control of 
executive power, and consider administrative law to be the tool which prevents the "powerful engines 
of authority from running amok".130 Such an approach is argued to hark back to Diceyan conceptions 
of the rule of law and the equality principle.131 Those subscribing to a "red light theory" would argue 
for a broad role for judicial review in order to protect individual rights.132  
In contrast, "green light theorists" consider administrative law not as responsible for placing a 
check on state power, but as a vehicle to assist the "administrative state" to implement collectivist 
policies.133 Green light theorists would prioritise democratic or political forms of accountability 
ahead of the undemocratic and unrepresentative courts.134 The role of judicial review would therefore 
be more limited and would consequently be available only in narrow circumstances.135  
Placing theories of administrative law into neat categories through the use of a simple metaphor 
has understandably attracted significant criticism.136 Such a metaphor is of limited use. However, at 
a more generalised explanatory level, the cases explored in this article do point to a continuing reliance 
on administrative law ideology as the basis for either a narrow or a broad approach to judicial review. 
The judges who advocate a narrow approach to judicial review consistently raise similar arguments 
for so limiting judicial review which are premised on a green light theory of administrative law. In 
contrast, those advocating a broader approach similarly raise arguments which are loosely premised 
on a red light theory of administrative law. 
  
128  Harlow and Rawlings, above n 7, at 1. 
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B The Narrow Approach 
Consistent with a green light theory of administrative law, a number of similar arguments have 
been drawn on by judges to justify a narrow approach to judicial review. These arguments fit broadly 
into two categories: arguments in favour of the "level playing field" approach; and arguments based 
on the idea that democratic and political accountability measures are better than the courts.  
In a New Zealand context, several judges have adopted a "level playing field approach" in order 
to narrow the scope of judicial review.137 The approach argues that subjecting SOEs to public law 
burdens will place them at a competitive disadvantage to their privately owned equivalents.138 Justice 
William Young clearly adopted this approach in Ririnui in holding that the policy underlying s 4 of 
the SOE Act precludes judicial review of commercial decisions.139 He argued that s 4, which requires 
an SOE to be as profitable as comparable businesses not owned by the Crown, would be frustrated if 
the Court was to allow judicial review of such decisions.140 The same approach was adopted by 
Richardson J in the Court of Appeal in Mercury.141 There is further evidence of the level playing field 
approach in William Young J's analysis of s 21 of the SOE Act. He argued that if s 21 did not operate 
to preclude judicial review in relation to contracts entered into by SOEs, it would allow third parties 
to challenge contracts entered into by an SOE on grounds otherwise not available to other commercial 
parties, thus placing SOEs at a commercial disadvantage.142 Similarly, in Lab Tests the majority held 
that to place onerous procedural requirements on the DHB would "unduly fetter" its ability to 
effectively negotiate in a commercial environment.143 This argument is further reflected in a Canadian 
context through the courts' consideration of private discretion in Air Canada144 and the concern to 
ensure that freedom of contract was not unduly affected in Shell.145  
Green light theorists see the courts as an obstacle to the efficient operation of the administrative 
state. 146  Accordingly, they would argue for the use of political and democratic accountability 
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measures in lieu of the courts.147 This point was made in Lab Tests where it was held that – in this 
context – other accountability measures would generally be more appropriate than the courts.148 In 
the High Court in Mercury, Barker J argued that judicial review's special procedural requirements 
would retard the speedy determination of what was essentially a commercial dispute.149 Consistent 
with this approach, a number of judgments have highlighted the availability of alternative 
accountability mechanisms in arguing for a narrow scope of review. These have included ministerial 
and parliamentary oversight;150 the resumption provisions under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975;151 
the Ombudsman;152 the Auditor-General;153 and accountability of directors to shareholders.154 In a 
similar vein, the courts have shown concern about the appropriateness of public law remedies. In 
Ririnui William Young J argued that judicial review would not be appropriate where criminal and 
civil remedies are available.155 Similarly, in Problem Gambling the Court refused to entertain the 
Foundation's application for review as it was merely a disappointed commercial party trying to use 
public law remedies in a commercial context.156 Finally, another concern raised by William Young J 
in Ririnui and echoed by others is the potential for a significant increase in litigation should the scope 
of review be broadened. This is a common "forum shopping" type argument which William Young J 
described as "gaming litigation".157 The negative public implications of excessive litigation were 
similarly identified in Shell.158 
C The Broad Approach 
It has been argued that the shift towards new public management and a reduced state would 
consequently result in the "rolling back" of judicial review as a cause of action.159 Such a reduced 
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role for the courts would be very concerning for red light theorists. However, this shift has simply 
resulted in judges coming up with creative ways to justify a broader approach to judicial review. The 
main way this has been achieved is through the use of arguments which centre on some broader public 
interest or public law element. Put another way, red light theorists have used the public interest as a 
proxy to justify a broad approach to judicial review. 
The best example of this approach is to be found in the majority judgment in Ririnui. In that case, 
the majority went to significant lengths to establish a public interest implication, and thus circumvent 
the general proposition in Mercury.160 This is to be contrasted with William Young J's approach 
which went to equal lengths to justify a narrow approach to judicial review. Further evidence of this 
approach in New Zealand is to be found in Problem Gambling. In light of Ririnui, the Court of Appeal 
in Problem Gambling held that where a claimant is seeking to protect the public interest in an 
application for judicial review, the court may adopt a broader scope of review in order to protect that 
interest.161 Woodhouse J adopted a similar approach in the High Court in arguing that the starting 
point in such matters is context; it is not the general proposition in Mercury, subject to context.162 In 
Phipps the relevance of the public interest was reflected in the Court's willingness to use judicial 
review to enquire into matters which have important public consequences.163 Similarly, in Webster 
the Court of Appeal suggested that in exercising its contracting powers, a public body might be 
constrained by its public law responsibilities, and in particular, the need to consider public interest 
factors when exercising contracting powers.164 
There is further evidence of such an approach in both England and Canada.  The English approach 
– as outlined in Hammer Trout Farm – relies on the existence of something with the character or 
flavour of public law to justify judicial review.165 Suggestions as to what constitutes this public law 
element have included: ensuring public bodies follow good administrative practice, especially in the 
case of matters of vital public importance;166 protecting common law rights;167 and, respecting public 
policy.168 In Canada, the courts have drawn on a number of public interest factors to justify a broad 
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approach to judicial review. These have included: public concerns about equality of access to 
government markets; integrity in the conduct of government business and the promotion of 
community values; the use of public funds;169 the carrying out of significant public projects;170 and, 
what was described in Air Canada as an "exceptional" category of cases, where the conduct engages 
a serious public dimension.171   
VI CONCLUSION 
This article has considered two recent developments in the case law concerning the justiciability 
of government contracting decisions. In Ririnui the majority of the Supreme Court provided an 
exception to the Mercury criteria by holding that not all commercial decisions will be reviewable on 
the narrow bases of fraud, corruption and bad faith. The majority did not define which decisions are 
likely to fall outside of the general proposition save to say that the case before the Court was excepted 
on the basis that it contained a substantial public interest component. This has likely opened the door 
to a broader role for judicial review in this context. In Problem Gambling the Court of Appeal added 
a further contextual factor to those outlined in Lab Tests. Justice Arnold held that as part of the 
contextual analysis, the courts must consider the nature of the interest that the claimant is seeking to 
protect.172 Where that interest is public in nature, the courts may be justified in adopting a broader 
scope of review to protect that interest.173  
Despite these developments, the law in this context remains inconsistent and incoherent. This is 
neither a contemporary issue, nor one which is limited to a New Zealand context. The article suggests 
that this lack of coherence and consistency is due to a court's approach to this issue being ultimately 
dependent on that court's normative conception of its role in this area, a conception which is premised 
on a theory of the state. As a result, the courts have tended to take either a narrow or a broad approach 
to judicial review. Those courts which subscribe to a green light theory of the state accordingly raise 
a number of similar arguments to justify a narrow approach to judicial review. In contrast, those courts 
subscribing to a red light theory raise similar arguments justifying a broader role.  
This normative butting of heads is especially pronounced in a government contracting context 
because it is an issue which sits on the border of the "nebulous line" between public and private law.174 
Some suggest that the distinction between public and private law is meaningless, and that attempting 
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to organise the law through the use of neat normative schemes could distort thinking about this 
issue.175   
The courts have certainly not ignored this and other normative schemes in deciding whether or 
not to allow judicial review in a given case. In fact, they have relied on them.  
Others have suggested that the courts can resolve the issue by drawing on values in common to 
both public and private law which will be capable of bridging the divide,176 or by developing a "law 
of public contracts".177 However, the New Zealand courts are still some way off reaching this point. 
Admittedly, the justiciability of government contracting decisions is a vexing issue. However, the 
New Zealand courts need to stop hiding behind an inconsistent doctrine and recognise that cases are 
ultimately being decided according to that court's normative conception of the role of judicial review 
in this area. 
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